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Policing in a Democratic Constitution 
MICHAEL WASCO 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Most constitutions contain provisions relating to or impacting policing. Separate from the 
armed forces and intelligence services, the police are the state’s internal security apparatus, and 
codifying issues related to policing within a constitution can ensure efficient service delivery and 
human rights protections.  
Originating from the Libyan constitution making process, this paper provides a taxonomy 
of options for constitution drafters and scholars. More so than other issues, such as separation of 
powers or human rights protections generally, policing sections are very country specific. While 
not advocating for specific best practices, the work gives ample justifications for certain policing 
principles and concepts, particularly regarding due process and gender matters. In any case, local 
constitution drafters will need to consider a wide breadth of options for what to include on policing 
and what to leave to legislative bodies.  
The constitutions in some countries, such as South Africa, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, 
Fiji, Kenya, and Nigeria, contain significant detail regarding the policing principles, mandates, and 
governance. In many other states, the constitution contains very limited detail and defers to 
national legislation for police formation and oversight. Many factors contribute to these variations, 
including the security status of the country, the context of the democratic transition, and the chosen 
overall government structure.  
Generally, modern constitutional representative democracies require police to serve and 
protect civilians. The current social movements in the United States addressing mistreatment of 
people of color and militarization of the police highlight the challenges of managing and training 
police. Constitution drafters must grapple with complex issues like the potential for misuse of 
force, the politicization of police, and the relationship between the police and the military. These 
themes are borne out around the world with constitutional language options as diverse as the States 
themselves. 
A. Scope and Content 
This paper analyzes how constitutional provisions may define, govern, or impact police 
forces. After defining the issue in section two, section three addresses the overall mandate of a 
nation’s police. To which general principles is it beholden? Section four discusses the governance 
of the police. How do the police function? What is its relationship to other institutions and security 
sectors? Section five is a deeper analysis of policing in federal and decentralized states. Section 
six addresses due process and human rights options. Section seven offers some additional 
constitutional design choices, including gender considerations, integration of the militias, and 
emergency powers. Section eight gives some final contextual considerations. And finally, section 
nine offers a table of examples summarizing missions and mandate structures for several countries. 
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Each section provides country specific examples and conditions drafters might consider when 
choosing language and content.  
For example, one choice in defining the mandate and mission of the police, is to ensure 
that it is of a civilian nature, one that is separate from the national military. The police serve and 
protect civilians, but they also must adhere to international principles regarding impartiality and 
professionalism. Countries recovering from conflict need to restore trust in police and security. 
Constitution making processes can be used to shift perception from fearing security forces as 
dispensers of political oppression to viewing them as fellow civilians assigned to serve and protect.  
Constitutional provisions on the governing of the police force include provisions on the 
appointment and removal of police commissioners or other high level officers. Some constitutions 
detail which authorities have command and control over the police and which have monitoring 
and oversight of police activities. Police actions cut across many constitutionally constructed 
institutions, such as the judiciary and many constitutions include provisions on how the police 
interact and relate to other institutions. Accordingly, the level of detail in how the police are 
managed may be related to the level of decentralization in the overall government structure, but 
not always.  
In addition to numerous cross cutting human rights issues, recent trends in conflict 
recovery and democratization have led to additional constitution design options relating to 
policing, such as the utility of gender considerations. Sections on funding, the effect of states of 
emergency or international armed conflict, codes of conduct/restrictions on the police in their 
capacity as actors within the state’s security sector, and provisions for the integration of militias 
into the police force may be particularly desirable for countries in democratic transition.  
B. Advantages and Risks 
In many cases, when constitution making or constitutional reform processes are taking 
place, a country is recovering from an undemocratic regime where the police were a source of 
corruption, political partiality, ethnic prejudice, and systemic abuses. Constitutional provisions 
organizing and describing the police not only serve as legal rules to be judicially enforced, but also 
as expressions of democratic values and principles. The more detail contained in these provisions, 
the more transparency in the state security apparatus. Civilians and lawyers can use the provisions 
as an advocacy tool to hold the police accountable and for reform when issues or abuses arise.  
Still, many countries hesitate to incorporate too much detail about police in the constitution, 
choosing instead to defer to local legislation and regulations as the primary legal framework 
governing the police and local security. Modern constitutions have become lengthy, inaccessible 
documents, and countries may choose to leave policing to local legislations simply for the sake of 
brevity. Depending on a country’s governmental structure and capacity, local authorities may be 
better equipped for organizing internal security systems. If a constitution provides too much 
direction for the police, drafters may run the risk of depleting the autonomy of a civilian led 
security force.  
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As importantly, constitution making can be an opportunity to create trust in the state and 
its security apparatus. In many countries, the police enjoy a certain degree of secrecy in carrying 
out investigations. This lack of transparency is often conducive to corrupt practices or undue 
political influence. Constitutional provisions that prohibit the police force from acting in a partisan 
manner or from favoring a particular political party may be beneficial in curbing corruption 
between politicians and members of the police. Likewise, constitutional provisions that provide 
for civilian oversight can also reduce the perception of corruption. Creating constitutional 
transparency in police hiring practices, procedures for processing complaints, and issuance of 
disciplinary decisions can also increase public trust in the police. 
Human rights abuses are another common challenge in policing. It can be advantageous 
to address due process, codes of conduct, and use of force in a constitution as this personalizes 
the document for the wider civilian population. In transition or developing countries, addressing 
these most basic fears can create faith and understanding in constitutional democracy.  
II. WHAT IS THE ISSUE? 
In all modern forms of democracy, the enforcement of the rule of law is essential. The 
current role and nature of policing is relatively recent historically. In early democracies, civilians 
were responsible for maintaining order among themselves. Constables and justices of the peace 
were not employees of any official institutions. In England, these local law enforcement officers 
evolved into “shire reeves,” or sheriffs, employed by the municipalities. As populations became 
more urban and civil unrest more common, professional law enforcement officers inevitably 
became an arm of the government. Taken to the extreme, police have been tools for government 
oppression and not protectors of civilians thus its incorporation into modern democratic 
constitutions.  
The constitution making process can be used to restore faith in the state’s security sector. 
Often, in transition countries civilians continue to perceive police as a threat. The former regime 
may have been ripe with corruption and rampant in persecution of certain segments of the 
population. Policing provisions in constitutions can be transformative as they are trying to create 
and/or reform institutions to overcome the brutality and partiality of the former regime.  
Today, policing represents a wide range of services and responsibilities, and constitution 
makers have many options for addressing the challenges of law enforcement and resolving issues 
of past regimes. Modern policing has been defined as “the function of that branch of the 
administrative machinery of government which is charged with the preservation of public order 
and tranquility, the promotion of the public health, safety, and morals, and the prevention, 
detection, and punishment of crimes.”1 Primarily, the police serve as the state’s internal security 
apparatus, most often at the most local levels, charged with maintaining internal public law and 
order. 
 




Although many countries leave the details of policing to more local legislation, 
circumstances surrounding a country’s recovery from conflict or transition from a non-democratic 
form of rule may make regulation of the police in the supreme law of the land desirable. Addressing 
the police in the constitution provides consistent and transparent rule of law. If the police function 
in a manner consistent with the constitution, and the constitution is consistent with international 
treaties and norms, then the operation of a police force is consistent with international legal 
standards and human rights protections. In addition, defining the relationship between the police 
and other security forces can create clarity and prevent conflicts with the state’s other actors.  
Thus, constitutions can be transformative in addressing both the overall governing structure 
of the police, as well as the underlying principles and mandate of the individual officers. Some 
states have provided great detail in how officers and leadership are appointed, disciplined and 
dismissed. Regarding the underlying principles, many options suggested below are available for 
detailing the role and motivations of the police, and their relationship to the civilians and other 
institutions.  
III. MISSION, MANDATE, AND PRINCIPLES OF THE POLICE  
The mission and/or mandate of the police defines where the police fit within the state’s 
security sector and how that position affects its operation. Codifying a clear mandate and mission 
for the police within the constitution provides an accountability mechanism at the highest level. 
The principles of the police provide guidelines for the daily interaction between the civilians and 
the police. Holding police accountable to internationally accepted ethical standards can restore 
trust and establish more efficiently run law enforcement. Defining the principles of a police force 
in the constitution is an opportunity to define the principles and moral fabric of the democratic 
state more generally.   
Here, the options run the gamut from very broad statements to specific enforceable 
principles and policies. However, in most countries, the constitution establishes the armed forces 
and the police force as two separate entities, often in a chapter outlining the security sector. Some 
countries have addressed the police in a public service chapter (e.g., Malaysia). Generally, the 
mission of the police force is to maintain public order; prevent, combat, and investigate crimes, 
and ensure compliance with the law (as seen in Brazil and Bolivia). Drafters can build a bridge 
between citizens and law enforcement by emphasizing the civilian nature of the police. 
Establishing trust in security officers is particularly critical in countries emerging from oppressive 
regimes, where previous security forces carried out abuses at the direction of the state.  
A. Subordinate to Civilian Authority 
The police are not military, and the constitution can emphasize how the police are 
subordinate to civilian command. Some states, such as South Africa, established a civilian 
secretariat to provide civilian oversight over the police (article 208). Separating the police from 
military and central government can help mend the relationship between civilians and security, 
which may have been exploited by the previous regime.  
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In Colombia where extreme violence and corruption from drug trafficking was of particular 
concern, the constitution describes a public force consisting of the Armed Forces and the National 
Police, exclusively (article 216). Colombia further describes the police mandate: 
Colombia Constitution Article 218 (1991, as revised 2005) 
The law will determine the organization of the Police corps. The National Police is a 
permanent armed body of a civilian nature responsible to the national community and 
whose primary purpose is the maintenance of the conditions necessary for the exercise of 
public rights and freedoms and to insure that the inhabitants of Colombia may live 
together in peace. The law will determine the career, benefits, and disciplinary regime that 
pertain to it.  
 
Here Colombia emphasizes the civilian nature of the police, further distancing it from the Armed 
Forces. Similarly in Macedonia and South Africa: 
 
Macedonia Constitution Article 97 (1991, as revised, 2011) 
The bodies of state administration in the fields of defense and the police are to be headed 
by civilians who have been civilians for at least three years before their election to these 
offices. 
South Africa Constitution Article 208 (1996, as revised 2012) 
A civilian secretariat for the police service must be established by national legislation to 
function under the direction of the Cabinet member responsible for policing. 
In addition to being subordinate to civilian command, effective police forces should be 
professional, trained, detached from politics (non-partisan), and under a single command (Mark 
2010). In several countries, constitutional provisions expressly prescribe these mandates to the 
police force (e.g. Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Nigeria). Constitutional provisions can also 
organize the police force as the exclusive security entity within the state, meaning that it is the 
only organization with jurisdiction over infractions provided in the law. Codifying the mission and 
mandate of the police within the constitution can also increase the effectiveness of the police. 
Impartial, professional police are more likely to obtain cooperation from the public in the 
investigation of crimes.  
B. Specific Principles 
As policing evolved, the need for a defining set of principles became necessary to curb 
abuses. Today, constitution makers can consult an array of internationally accepted philosophies 
on policing. In forming the British metropolitan police in the early 19th century, Great Britain 
began implementing basic principles for policing currently known as “Peel’s 9 Principles of 
Policing.” The principles of Sir Robert Peel include maintaining impartiality, and the use of 
physical force only as a last resort, and only proportionally.2 The United Nations has also 
 
2  Sir Robert Peel’s Principles of Law Enforcement, 1829: http://www.civitas.org.uk/research/crime/facts-
comments/principles-of-good-policing/ 
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incorporated suggestions for effective policing in numerous instruments including the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Basic Principles on the Use of Force 
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, and the UN General Assembly, Code of Conduct for 
Law Enforcement Officials.  
Articulating principles in the constitution may also help in the recruitment and efficacy of 
the departments. Officers know what they are signing up for and feel pride and unity within their 
respective units. With the United Nation’s guidelines and Peel’s principles as a foundation, some 
issues constitutions contemplate include:  
• Professionalism,  
• Monopoly over Policing Functions at the National Level,  
• Singular and Unified Command, and  




1. To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity of legal 
punishment. 
2. To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public 
approval of their existence, actions and behaviour, and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect. 
3. To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the 
securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws. 
4. To recognise always that the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured diminishes 
proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives. 
5. To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating 
absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice 
of the substance of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public 
without regard to their wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humour, and by 
ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life. 
6.To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient 
to obtain public co-operation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order, and to use only 
the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective. 
7. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the 
police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to 
give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and 
existence. 
8.To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain from even 
seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary, of avenging individuals or the State, and of authoritatively judging guilt 
and punishing the guilty. 
9. To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the 




Constitutional provisions may also require that the police force be a professional corps, 
ensuring that being a member of the police is a public service career and that the police force 
consists of trained and qualified individuals. Such a categorization can also infuse the job with a 
sense of pride and respect. For example, the Dominican Republic Constitution (article 255) 
ascribes the National Police as an “armed corps, technical, professional and of a policing nature”.  
2. Monopoly over Policing Functions at the National Level 
Constitutional provisions may also explicitly create the national or federal police as the 
only legitimate, lawful police force in the state. This prevents non-state militia and other armed 
groups from claiming authority or acting in the capacity of state police. This is also referred to as 
creating a monopoly over the right to police.   
Many countries are particularly susceptible to the formation of voluntary militias and other 
non-state actors as vigilantes in the guise of protecting the peace. For example, Nigeria established 
the Nigeria Police Force and specifically prohibits the formation of any other such police force 
(article 214). 
3. Singular and Unified Command 
Similarly, and for the same purpose, constitutional provisions can provide that the police 
force acts under a single and unified command. 
Bolivia Constitution Article 251(I) (2009) 
[The Bolivian Police] shall carry out the police function in a comprehensive, indivisible 
manner and under a single command, pursuant to the Organic Law of the Bolivian Police 
and the other laws of the State. 
4. Respect for Human Rights 
In addition to due process requirements, refrain from torture, and other specific human 
rights protections discussed later, constitutions can instill faith in the police department by calling 
for a general respect for human rights by the police as an overall general principle. 
East Timor Constitution Article 147(2) (2002) 
The prevention of crime shall be undertaken with due respect for human rights. 
El Salvador Constitution Article 152 (1983, as revised, 2003) 
[. . .] The National Civil Police shall be charged with the functions of urban police and 
rural police, which guarantee order, security and public tranquility, as well as 
collaboration in the investigation of crime, and all the proceeding in accordance with the 




IV. GOVERNANCE OF THE POLICE 
Governance provisions of the police in constitutions are wide ranging.  Most constitutions 
delegate details regarding the formation and governance of the police to national legislation. This 
parallels the trend of more decentralized governments, however, as discussed below, management 
of police forces is not necessarily a direct reflection of the level of government decentralization. 
Generally speaking, constitutional provisions can provide a limited outline of the organizational 
structure and management of the police in order to create transparency and legitimacy. For 
example, Nigeria’s constitution describes the various leadership positions within the police, how 
they are appointed, and their basic responsibilities (article 215).  
When addressing the overall structure of the police force or forces within the constitution, 
the primary challenge is how to maintain the desired autonomy of the police while establishing 
accountability at the highest political level. The police should be free from political influence in 
determining whom and when to investigate. At the same time, the formation of the police should 
allow for general public accountability and the reflection of public values. Stable democracies 
require an independent and accountable police force which reflects and can relate to the general 
population.  
Police governance issues constitutions have considered include: 
• Appointment and removal of the officers and leadership 
• Overall command and control 
• Ethnic quotas or power sharing arrangements 
• Independent oversight commissions 
A. Appointment and Removal 
Constitutions often contain sections detailing the process and/or authority for appointment, 
removal, promotion, and demotion of police personnel. Some assign these responsibilities to a 
national police council or commission or to the head or chief of the police force. Another option 
is giving the president or head of state the authority to appoint and remove officials in the police 
force (e.g. Dominican Republic, Afghanistan). Certain methods may be more compatible with 
certain types of executive government structures.  
Nepal’s 2015 constitution established a true parliamentary system assigning police to 
various levels of government including the “Nepal Police” and “Armed Police Force” at the federal 
level, in addition to police at the provincial and municipal levels (articles 268). Operation, 
supervision and coordination of Nepal Police and provincial police are provided by federal law, 
however, the constitution forms the “Public Service Commission” which is tasked with conducting 
the written examinations for the recruitment of police officers (article 243). In addition, 
consultation with the Public Service Commission is required before the promotion of officers 
within the police (article 243). The president appoints the chairperson of the Public Service 
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Commission and the members of the Commission are selected through a complex appointment 
process (article 242). 
In true presidential systems, one option is for the president or head of state to be involved 
in the process but for other institutions to provide checks and balances. For example, Bolivia’s 
constitution grants the president the power to designate and substitute the General Commander of 
the Bolivian Police and to propose promotions for the General of the Police to the Pluri-National 
Legislative Assembly. The constitution then provides for a check on executive powers by granting 
the legislature the power to ratify promotions by the executive branch to this position (article 160). 
In a similar manner, Nigeria’s constitution provides that the president may only remove a person 
holding an office within the Nigeria Police Council or Police Service Commission with the support 
of a two-thirds senate majority. It also requires that appointment by the President of the Inspector 
General of the Police be on the advice of the Nigeria Police Council (article 157).  
Accordingly, there are options for the appointment, removal, and selection of police 
officers and leadership. Giving the executive too much authority in the appointment of officers 
politicizes and threatens the autonomy of the officers at the most local level but creates 
accountability at the highest level. Forming intermediary commissions and checks and balances 
may insulate the police from direct political influence but is costly, time consuming, and 
bureaucratic. The chosen methods should allow for merit based promotion while at the same time 
impartial accountability for the officers and leadership.    
B. Command and Control 
“Command and control” is the ability to determine force strength of the police service, 
direct the police, and form additional security apparatuses. Command and control in these respects 
may be shared between the executive and legislative branches. For example, the Dominican 
Republic constitution grants the legislature the power to form additional public security forces 
such as a special presidential guard upon the request of the president. It also sets forth the burden 
that must be met to do so. The constitution specifies that any such security force will be 
subordinated to the competent and appropriate authority as defined by law. In so doing, the 
constitution ensures that all police forces operate according to the rule of law (articles 128, 261). 
One option for ensuring independence in the command and control of the police is the 
establishment of police commissions and police commissioners. In most cases police commissions 
are not directly addressed in constitutions but are derived from local government initiatives. 
However, smaller countries have assigned the command and control of the police exclusively to a 
police commissioner appointed by the president (e.g. Fiji, article 129). With oversight from a 
central government Minister, the Fiji constitution gives the commissioner almost exclusive 
authority for staffing and deployment decisions. Such an arrangement may not be ideal in larger 
countries where mayors and governors may wish to maintain some control over local policing.  
Nigeria’s constitution calls for an “Inspector-General of Police” and a “Commissioner of 
Police” for each state in the Federation (article 215).  
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Nigeria Constitution Article 215 (2) (1999) 
The Nigeria Police Force shall be under the command of the Inspector-General of 
Police and contingents of the Nigeria Police Force stationed in a state shall, subject 
to the authority of the Inspector-General of Police, be under the command of the 
Commissioner of Police of that state. 
Accordingly, orders, directives, and instructions to perform or carry out the police duties 
flows from the Inspector-General of Police through the chain of command to the most local 
officers. The Nigerian system also calls for strict penalties for those who fail to follow directives 
(article 215). 
 
C.  Ethnic Quotas or Power Sharing Agreements 
Regarding the overall make-up of the police force, diverse post-conflict states may wish to 
require that the members of the police reflect the state’s ethnic diversity. In this respect, ethnic, 
tribal, or other quotas may be imposed at the national and/or local levels. In some states, such as 
Burundi, such quotas are the outcome of a specific power- sharing arrangement agreed upon in a 
peace agreement.  
 
Burundi Constitution Article 130 (2005) 
The President of the Republic, after consultation with the two Vice-Presidents of the 
Republic, sees to it that the Minister given the charge of the Force of National Defense is 
not of the same ethnicity as the Minister responsible for the National Police. 
Such agreements are based on the basic conflict prevention premise of inclusion. Those 
left out of the system can be far more dangerous than those without formal responsibilities. In 
addition, ensuring a diverse police force will facilitate the relationships between the police and 
the diverse civilian population. For example, Kosovo’s constitution states the following: 
Kosovo Constitution Article 128 (2008) 
2. The Police shall be professional and reflect the ethnic diversity of the 
population of the Republic of Kosovo… 4. The Police of the Republic of Kosovo 
shall have a unified chain of command throughout the Republic of Kosovo with 
police stations corresponding to municipal boundaries. The Kosovo Police shall 
facilitate cooperation with municipal authorities and community leaders through 
the establishment of Local Councils as provided by law. Ethnic composition of 
the police within a municipality shall reflect the ethnic composition of the 
population within the respective municipality to the highest extent possible. 
 
D.  Independent Commissions 
More sophisticated and advanced police systems may assign inspection, audit, and 
evaluation to non-police bodies, such as an independent ministry, council, or commission. Other 
examples of such bodies include national public security boards, inspectorates, non-
departmental complaint boards, human rights structures, and special or standing committees of 
the parliament. Monitoring and oversight of the police can be undertaken at the national and/or 
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provincial levels. Constitutional provisions have provided direction on the formation of the 
commissions and assigned them to oversee police force operations, respond to complaints of 
corruption, and provide reports to the government. Additionally, in some states, such as 
Ethiopia, the legislature has oversight role to investigate the police forces in the event of alleged 
human rights violations (article 55). In addition to these mechanisms or independently, 
constitutions may also call for civilian monitoring and reporting mechanisms, whereby police 
officials and community representatives coordinate evaluations of police operations (OECD, 
2007). 
 
Provisions establishing a commission or council may be included in the section on 
independent commissions and institutions or in the section dedicated to the armed forces and/or 
national security and defense. The level of detail provided in constitutions about the 
composition, mandate, and function of each monitoring and oversight mechanism varies from 
state to state. In some countries, such as Malaysia, the constitution establishes a commission 
and then details its jurisdiction, functions, and composition (article 140). In most other countries, 
the constitution simply establishes the mechanisms and leaves the details of their functioning to 
legislation. 
 
Nigeria Constitution Article 153.1(l)-(m) (1999) 
There shall be established for the Federation the following bodies, namely: [. . .] 
(l) Nigeria Police Council . . .; (m) Police Service Commission. 
South Africa Constitution Article 206 (1996, as revised, 2012) 
3. Each province is entitled- 
a. to monitor police conduct;  
b. to oversee the effectiveness and efficiency of the police service, 
including receiving reports on the police service;  
 c. to promote good relations between the police and the community;  
 d. to assess the effectiveness of visible policing; and to liaise with the 
Cabinet member responsible for policing with respect to crime and policing in the 
province.  
5. In order to perform the functions set out in subsection (3), a province- 
a. may investigate, or appoint a commission of inquiry into, any 
complaints of police inefficiency or a breakdown in relations between the police 
and any community; and  
b. must make recommendations to the Cabinet member responsible for 
policing.  
6. On receipt of a complaint lodged by a provincial executive, an independent 
police complaints body established by national legislation must investigate any 
alleged misconduct of, or offence committed by, a member of the police service 
in the province. 
 
V.  POLICING IN FEDERAL AND DECENTRALIZED STATES 
Decentralization in the governance context means the transfer of political, administrative, 
and fiscal authority from the central government to provincial and/or local units (USAID, 2009). 
 12 
Decentralized state structure typically includes a central government, provincial governments 
(sometimes referred to states or regions), and local governments (sometimes called municipalities). 
In decentralized states, authority over public services, such as the police services, are frequently 
transferred from the central or national level to the provincial or local level.  
 
The degree of decentralization - that is - the degree to which different levels of government 
can establish and maintain a police force, is a key consideration in drafting provisions related to 
the police. Should a country wish to provide more detail in the constitution on the overall structure 
and governance of the police, the first step is to determine the level of decentralization and if there 
are to be multiple layers of policing (federal, state, local), how those levels interact with each other. 
The level of decentralization of the police does not necessarily reflect the level of decentralization 
of the overall government.  
 
The rationale for a fragmented police force paralleling a truly decentralized government 
structure is twofold. First, for countries recovering from conflict or regime change, citizens may 
harbor deep resentment and mistrust of the federal authorities. Second, implicit in constitutional 
democracies is the idea that local problems are best managed at the local level. To address these 
two issues, countries may wish to divide the police into separate units at the federal, 
provincial/regional, and local levels. This system is not without its challenges. First, there should 
be uniform standards for recruitment, management, and policies across all of the departments. 
Second, these systems tend to require a higher number of overall police officers, which may be 
duplicating efforts across jurisdictions. And related, it has to be determined how information and 
evidence is shared across and among the agencies.  
 
In a true federal system, authority is divided but shared between the central government 
and the more local levels. Federalism is a constitutional mechanism for dividing power between 
different levels of government, such that federated units can enjoy substantial, constitutionally 
guaranteed autonomy over certain policy areas while sharing power in accordance with agreed 
rules over other policy areas. Thus, federalism combines partial self-government with partial 
shared government.3  
 
Even among similarly decentralized states and federations, policing structures may vary. 
This makes sense as federalism and decentralization did not evolve with the governing of the police 
in mind. For example, smaller decentralized states, such as East Timor, simply state that the law 
shall determine the rules and regulations for the police and other security forces (article 147).4 In 
larger decentralized states, or quasi-federations, the constitution may provide that the police be 
structured at one or more levels of government. South Africa, for example, assigns police at the 
national, provincial, and local levels (articles 205 and 207). 
 
Variations can even be seen within countries, such as Switzerland and Spain. In Spain, the 
constitution allows for Catalonia and the Basque Country to have their own police forces while 
other regions rely on the central force (section 149). Switzerland also maintains an asymmetrical 
level of policing among cantons and municipalities. Federal responsibilities are mostly limited to 
 
3 Federalism is a complex concept, for more on decentralization and federalism see Federalism (International IDEA 
Constitution-Building Primer, May 2015). 
4 See also; Dominican Republic Constitution article 256, and Belgium Constitution article 184. 
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terrorism and organized crime. Uniformed police only exist in the canton levels and maintaining 
order and investigation of crimes is entirely distributed to cantons (article 57). Cantons can 
themselves further devolve policing powers to municipalities, which is the case in a majority, but 
not all of the cantons. 
 
In any case, the capacity of the most local institutions is one consideration in determining 
the level of decentralization of a police force. In some post-conflict states, certain populations or 
localities lack adequate security due to an overly centralized security sector. Thus, decentralizing 
the police force may enable greater provisions of security to all parts of the state and to all 
populations. In this respect, police service is based on local needs and local dynamics and is not 
subject to excessively bureaucratic central government policies. For instance, Liberia’s reform 
assessment determined that the security forces were too centralized and that decentralization 
should extend the reach of the police, prosecutors, and other security and justice services outside 
the capital. Therefore it established Count Security Councils to implement the state’s security 
policies at the local level (International Peace Institute, 2012).  
 
In other cases, fear of a return to dictatorship may call for limiting the central government’s; 
and particularly the executive branch’s power over the local security sector. Most recently in the 
Libya constitution making process, the drafters were very interested in outlining a detailed 
structure for a decentralized police force. Drafters should also consider context, culture, and ethnic 
breakdowns. In some cases, a strong, centrally governed police force may prevent minority 
oppression in localities with warring tribal factions. In other cases, local police of the same 
background of the constituents can bridge the gap between the civilians and the security sector.  
 
A.  State and federal police relationships  
Once the number and type of police departments are determined, the constitution can 
provide guidance on jurisdictional authority and the internal relationship between the center and 
localities. Policing powers refer to the competencies of police given by the constitution and the 
ability of the civilian authorities to establish, instruct, and monitor a police force (Coginta, 2011). 
Constitutions can allocate competencies/powers to the various levels of government detailed in the 
examples below. 
 
1. Federal Policing Powers 
Responsibilities for police at the federal or central level are usually limited to the 
maintenance of the public order in the case of major external shocks, intelligence gathering, and 
management of evidence and data at the national level. 
 
One of the challenges in decentralized policing is defining and resolving jurisdictional 
issues among the different levels of the police. In some states, the central government retains power 
over the national, central, and/or federal police services. In most states, this power is often held 
concurrently with state or provincial level governments, meaning that both levels of government 
may make laws and exercise control over the police in their respective jurisdictions or concerning 
specific issues. Concurrent powers often create the need for a dispute resolution mechanisms 
because they create overlap between the central government’s powers and the local governments’ 
powers. The constitution may clarify which level of government takes priority in the event of a 
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conflict. Countries have two options for resolving disputes over concurrent powers where 
provincial and central government laws conflict: (1) provincial laws take priority over the central 
government law; or (2) central government laws take priority over the provincial law. Ideally, the 
federal constitution is the supreme law of the land, meaning that the states may not make laws that 
contradict the federal constitution.  
 
In some federal systems, maintaining public order may also be considered a federal 
responsibility by the constitution or by law. India’s constitution allows the union to deploy “any 
armed force in any state in aid of the civil power” according to the union list of competencies. 
According to one of the “Emergency Provisions,” it is the “duty of the union to protect every state 
against external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure that the government of every 
state is carried on in accordance with the provisions of this constitution” (article 355). If there is a 
breakdown of the constitutional machinery in any state, then the central government assumes all 
functions of the state government. 
 
2. Provincial or Regional Policing Powers  
In most constitutions, provincial and/or local governments are granted varying degrees of 
authority over police in their respective jurisdictions. In some states, such as South Africa, the 
constitution further requires that national policing policy be informed by provincial needs (articles 
205 and 206). Other states assign power explicitly to the regional level (e.g. Iraq). Proponents of 
more balanced systems where provinces and cantons have increased police responsibilities argue 
that such arrangements prevent meddling by the central government in local affairs.   
 
As mentioned above, Switzerland vests the administration of justice in the member cantons 
but the penal code and criminal procedure is left to the federal level (article 123). Many 
constitutions, particularly in federations, provide lists of responsibilities for each level or branch 
of government. These lists are a way to assign police powers and oversight to the state and federal 
levels. India’s constitution lists responsibilities for the union (federal) and the states, and for 
“concurrent” powers. In this system, the power to organize the police is assigned to the states, but 
criminal procedure is left to the concurrent powers list (article 246). In practice, this means that 
both the state legislature and the federal legislature can make laws regarding the police, but when 
a conflict arises, the union law controls (article 257).  
 
3. Local Policing Powers 
Some constitutions set forth the powers of local or municipal governments with respect to 
policing. The clearest example may be Colombia: 
 
Colombia Constitution Article 315(2) (1991, as revised 2005) 
The following are powers of the mayor:  [. . .] 2. To protect the public order in the 
municipality, in accordance with the law and the instructions and orders that the 
mayor may receive from the President of the Republic and the respective 
governor. The mayor is the highest police authority of the municipality. The 
National Police will promptly and diligently execute the orders given to it by the 
mayor through the channel of the respective commander. 
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In federal state structures, constitutional provisions related to local police powers may 
establish a mechanism for coordination among the different levels of government and their 
respective police authorities. Concerned with possible jurisdictional conflicts or confusion, the 
South Africa constitution established a specific committee to address this issue: 
South Africa Constitution Article 206(8) (1996, as revised, 2012) 
A committee composed of the Cabinet member and the members of the Executive 
Councils responsible for policing must be established to ensure effective coordination of 
the police service and effective co-operation among the spheres of government. 
Still another consideration when assigning police power is the nature of the crimes and 
services the police can be expected to encounter. For example, the prevention of potentially cross-
jurisdictional crimes, such as nationwide gangs, or drug trafficking, require cooperation among 
local law enforcement and between local law enforcement and the center. Similarly, delegation of 
police powers should consider access to resources such as forensic labs and evidence storage. 
B.  Funding 
Policing in decentralized and federal states also impacts the funding of the police, and 
several countries have incorporated funding structures within constitutions. The power to 
determine wages and benefits of police is in most cases is left to the legislative branch to manage, 
and this is the most common approach: 
Colombia Constitution Article 150(19)(e) (1991, as revised 2005) 
It is the responsibility of Congress to enact laws. Through them, it exercises the 
following functions: [. . .] 19. To enact general rules that specify the objectives and 
criteria to which the Government must be subjected for the following purposes: [. . .] 
To establish the system of wage and benefits concerning public servants, members of 
the National Congress, and the Police Force [. . .].  
Nigeria Constitution Article 84(1) (1999) 
There shall be paid to the holders of the offices mentioned in this section such 
remuneration, salaries and allowances as may be prescribed by the National Assembly, 
but not exceeding the amount as shall have been determined by the Revenue 
Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission.  
1.  Potential Sources 
 
Additionally, in some countries, the constitution specifies the source of funding for the 
police. This often consists of a consolidated fund used for other public services provided by the 
state.  
Nigeria Constitution Article 84 (1999) 
[. . .] 2. The remuneration, salaries and allowances payable to the holders of the offices 
so mentioned shall be a charge upon the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation. 
3. The remuneration and salaries payable to the holders of the said offices and their 
conditions of service, other than allowances, shall not be altered to their disadvantage 
after their appointment.  
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4. The offices aforesaid are the offices of [. . .] the Nigeria Police Council and the Police 
Service Commission. 
2.  Access to Expenditure Information  
 
In situations where funding of the police does not come directly from the central 
government, constitutional provisions may grant the executive the power to access information 
on expenditures in the public sector, including the police force. Such provisions provide for 
accountability at the highest level while maintaining autonomy at the local level.  
Bolivia Constitution Article 321(V) (2009) 
The Executive Organ, through the Ministry of the relevant branch, shall have direct 
access to the information concerning the expenses that are budgeted and spent in every 
public sector. This access shall include information on the expenses budgeted and spent 
by the Bolivian Armed Forces and Police. 
VI. HUMAN RIGHTS AND DUE PROCESS 
Should a country wish to emphasize human rights protections related to policing, numerous 
international instruments provide guidance. Although police are primarily in place to enforce the 
law and provide internal security, constitutional provisions can also lay the foundation for ensuring 
that the police themselves adhere to human rights legal norms. In addition to the policing principles 
addressed above, codifying specific human rights protections related to policing in constitutions 
can mend the fissures formed by oppressive security forces of a previous regime.  
International legal standards can be used to draft language on several specific human rights 
issues. Common accepted practice is to use international treaties to ensure that the relationship 
between the police and civilians at the most local level is consistent with international law. Detailed 
human rights provisions can create confidence in the citizenry of the constitutional process, 
democracy, and the rule of law generally.  
Often in countries emerging from conflict, civilians have little or no interest in the content 
of their country’s future constitution. Their primary concerns are food, water, and shelter. From 
their perspective, whether or not their country has a bicameral system or a single parliamentary 
chamber is irrelevant and is not seen as impacting their daily lives. However, in these cases, safety 
and security are priorities. If civilians observe a constitutional process taking their well-being into 
consideration through the codification of basic protections, they may be more likely to participate 
in the constitution making process themselves.  
A.  International and Regional Standards 
Several international and regional instruments identify human rights and set forth 
obligations of states to protect and promote those rights. Almost every country has taken steps to 
ratify the United Nations treaties related to the police and human rights.5 Treaties which may be 
used to inform human rights language within police and security sector chapters include but are 
not limited to: 
 
5 e.g. at least 185 countries have taken steps to ratify the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. http://indicators.ohchr.org/ 
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• The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
• The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
• The UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhume or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment  
• The UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials 
• The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force 
• Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment 
• Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and 
Summary Executions 
• Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances 
These obligations and standards provide guidance on code of conduct, due process, police, 
restrictions on the use of force, and treatment of prisoners and detained persons.  
1.  Code of Conduct 
The UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials provides standards and guidelines 
for the daily work of police officers. It provides that in the performance of their duty, law 
enforcement officials shall respect and protect human dignity and maintain and uphold the human 
rights of all persons. Furthermore, the Code of Conduct provides that law enforcement officials 
shall only use force when strictly necessary and to the extent required for them to carry out their 
duties. It prohibits torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment as well 
as corruption. The Code also requires that matters of a confidential nature in the possession of law 
enforcement officials be kept confidential unless the performance of duty or the needs of justice 
strictly require otherwise. Additionally, the Code of Conduct obligates law enforcement officials 
to protect the health of persons in their custody and to secure medical attention immediately when 
it is required. Finally, the Code of Conduct requires law enforcement officials to respect the law 
and to prevent and oppose any violations thereof. Regarding accountability, the Code of Conduct 
details processes for reporting any violations to the superior authorities. 
2.  Due Process 
Due process guarantees that a government may not deprive any person of his or her life, 
liberty, or property without a fair trial and other legal rights as enumerated by law. The UN Body 
of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, 
provides for the rights of persons deprived of liberty both as a result of convictions and as a result 
of detention without conviction. The 2010 International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance requires proper training for all law enforcement personnel 
involved in custody or treatment of persons deprived of their liberty. Several additional UN 
documents provide standards and guidelines for other due process related issues, including the 
Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra Legal, Arbitrary and Summary 
Executions and the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.   
Many constitutions use these treaties to inform language on due process, for example: 
Bolivia Constitution Article 22(II) (2009) 
The imposition of measures depriving the liberty of adolescents shall be avoided. Every 
adolescent who is deprived of liberty shall receive preferential treatment on the part of 
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the judicial, administrative and police authorities. They shall assure at all times respect 
for the dignity of the adolescent and their anonymity. The detention shall be carried out 
in premises distinct from those assigned to adults, taking into account the needs of his or 
her age. 
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany Article 104(2) (1949, as revised, 
2012) [. . .] The police may hold no one in custody on their own authority beyond the 
end of the day following the arrest. Details shall be regulated by a law. 
 
Guatemala Constitution Articles 8, 13 (1985, as revised 1993) 
8. All detained [persons] must be informed immediately of their rights in a form that will 
be understandable, especially [of the right] to use a defender, who may be present at all 
police and judicial diligences. The detained [person] cannot be obligated to testify except 
before a competent judicial authority.  
13. The police authorities may not present [,] of office, before the media of social 
communication, any person who has not been previously investigated by a competent 
tribunal. 
3.  Use of Force 
The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force set forth international standards for when and 
to what degree law enforcement officers may use force. These principles urge states to equip law 
enforcement personnel with non-lethal weapons and ammunition in an effort to restrain the 
capacity to inflict lethal force. Police officers are to use non-lethal force before resorting to lethal 
force or firearms. Force and firearms are only to be used when other means prove ineffective and 
cannot achieve the intended result. Additionally, the Basic Principles set forth guidelines for law 
enforcement officials in policing assemblies and policing persons in custody or detention. The 
Basic Principles also require states to ensure that law enforcement officials have the proper 
training, are subjected to screening processes, and have the appropriate moral, psychological, and 
physical qualities for the effective exercise of their duties.   
4. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment 
The United Nations as well as several regional instruments affirm the right of every person 
to be free from all forms of torture and inhuman treatment. The UN Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment is the primary international 
instrument providing standards for the prevention of torture. The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights is a regional example which broadly affirms that all forms of exploitation and 
degradation are prohibited, though it does not define what types of behavior fall into this category.  
B.  Specific Human Rights Provisions 
Aside from the human rights protections stressed in chapters dealing specifically with the 
police and security, several other constitution sections may indirectly touch on human rights issues 
related to policing.  
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1. Freedom of Assembly 
The police often play an important role in supporting the handling of peaceful 
demonstrations. Thus, constitutional provisions supporting freedom of assembly and association 
can reference the police. Chile provides a good example: 
Chile Constitution Article 19(13) (1908, as amended, 2012) 
The right to assemble peacefully without prior permission and without weapons.  
Meetings at squares, streets and other places of public use are ruled by the general 
provisions [concerning] the police. 
In addition, some constitutions provide that the right to peacefully assemble may be 
restricted for members of the police; perhaps to maintain the appearance of political impartiality 
of the police force. Armenia for example: 
 Armenia Constitution Article 29 (1995, as revised, 2005) 
Everyone shall have the right to the freedom of a peaceful and unarmed assembly. 
Restrictions on exercising those rights by the servicemen in the armed forces, police, 
national security, prosecutor’s office, judges and members of the Constitutional Court 
may be prescribed only by law. 
 
2. Freedom of Association 
Similarly, constitutional human rights provisions protecting the right for freedom of 
association have also recently begun referencing the police. More specifically, some constitutions 
expressly provide that members of the police do not have the right to form associations. 
Alternatively, constitutional provisions may permit the restrictions of police officer’s right to 
freely associate. 
Colombia Constitution Article 39 (1991, as revised 2005) 
Members of the police force do not have the right to form associations. 
Armenia Constitution Article 28 (1995, as revised, 2005) 
The rights to set up parties and trade unions and join them may be restricted in a manner 
prescribed by law for the servicemen of the armed forces, police, national security, 
prosecutor’s office, as well as judges and members of the Constitutional Court.  
Macedonia Constitution Article 37 (1991, as revised, 2011) 
In order to exercise their economic and social rights, citizens have the right to establish 
trade unions. Trade unions can constitute confederations and become members of 
international trade union organizations. The law may restrict the conditions for the 






Very few states have taken the political independence of the police to the extreme by 
restricting the right of the police to vote. Such language conflicts with voting rights. The 
Dominican Republic is one example: 
Dominican Republic Constitution Article 208 (2010) 
The members of the Armed Forces and of the National Police, or those who have lost 
their rights of citizenship or are found suspended in regards to those rights, do not have 
the right of suffrage. 
VI. ADDITIONAL DESIGN CHOICES 
A.  Gender Considerations 
Since the ratification of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, it has been widely 
understood that increasing the number of women within the security sector makes for a more 
effective police force.6 Many studies have concluded that having women police officers improves 
police response to violence against women, reduces police brutality and excessive force, and 
strengthens community policing reforms (DCAF, 2011). Diverse police forces can assimilate 
easier with the civilians they are tasked with protecting. For these reasons and others, many recent 
constitutions have addressed the specific issue of women within the police.  
1.  International Standards 
Numerous international legal instruments require that states respect, protect and fulfill 
women’s right to gender equality. In particular, the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and now several UN Security Council Resolutions 
contain binding obligations and guidelines for member nations with respect to women within the 
security sector. UNSCR 1325 invites states to incorporate materials on the protection, rights, and 
particular needs of women in national training programs from military and civilian police. Article 
7 of CEDAW requires the States Parties to take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the political and public life of the state and to ensure women the 
right to hold public office, perform public functions, and be eligible for election to all publicly 
elected bodies.  
2.  Gender Equality and Non-Discrimination 
Constitutional provisions that guarantee equal rights to men and women in all domains 
of society may enable gender integration in the security forces.7 Most countries now include 
gender equality and equity as a broadly applicable principle in the constitution. Some countries 
even expressly require gender equality within the police service (e.g. Ecuador). Additionally, 
 
6 At the time of this publication 60 countries have implemented UNSCR 1325 National Action Plans on women 
peace and security. 
7 Challenges may arise in the implementation of such provisions, particularly where local traditions or practices 
assign differing societal roles for men and women. See, DCAF 2011.  
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because the police service is often within the broader public service, constitutional provisions 
may establish gender equity as one of the bases for eligibility in the public service. Finally, in 
most states, the constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender. In line with this 
practice, Libya’s 2011 Constitutional Declaration provides that Libyans, “shall be equal before 
the law, enjoy equal civil and political rights, have the same opportunities in all areas and be 
subject to the same public duties and obligations, without distinction on the grounds of . . . 
gender” (article 6). 
Ecuador is another good example: 
Ecuador Constitution Article 160 (2008) 
Members of the Armed Forces and the National Police Force shall be subject to specific 
laws governing their rights and obligations and subject to their system of advancement 
and promotions based on merit and gender equity criteria. Their job security and 
professional development shall be guaranteed. 
3.  Quotas  
Quotas are one way to ensure women’s inclusion in the security forces, though this is 
frequently accomplished through legislation, internal police regulations, or national policies 
rather than constitutional provisions. In Sierra Leone, for instance, the Sierra Leone Police set a 
quota of 30% for female officers (UNDP 2007). In rebuilding the Liberian National Police 
following the end of the fourteen-year-long conflict, the United Nations Mission in Liberia 
established a 20% quota for women’s inclusion in the police and armed forces. To meet this 
quota, the Liberian National Police established a Female Recruitment Programme. The program 
faced challenges primarily due to the educational disparities among men and women recruits. To 
overcome this challenge, the program selected 150 women to attend classes and receive a high 
school diploma. In return, they agreed to serve in the National Police force for a certain number 
of years.   
4. Gender Violence  
Constitutional provisions may expressly condemn or require the criminalization of 
gender-related violence, such as gang violence, rape, and child abuse. The Constitution of the 
Dominican Republic, for instance, condemns gender violence in all its forms, and requires the 
state to adopt measures necessary to prevent, sanction, and eradicate violence against women 
(article 42). Outside of the constitution, integrating gender in the police training curriculum and 
including women in the police force may enhance the ability of the police to effectively prevent 
and investigate gender-related violence. 
B.  Integrating Militia Members into the Police  
Often countries involved in constitution making or reform processes are simultaneously 
involved in peace processes (e.g. Libya). Peace accords for post-conflict states often include 
security sector reform programs to restructure the armed forces—including the military and the 
police—into unified, professional, and lawful national forces. In many cases, this process is 
outlined in a peace agreement and then implemented through national legislation, policies, or 
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decrees. Because of its transitional nature and to ensure consistency some permanent constitutions 
expressly address security sector reform or the accompanying integration process, as described 
briefly below.   
1. Integration of Security Forces 
Post-conflict security sector reform programs often provide for the integration of ex-
combatants, or members of former armed groups or militias, into newly integrated and reformed 
security forces, including local police. Integration processes are frequently coupled with formal 
reintegration procedures, whereby former combatants are assimilated back into civilian life. To 
be integrated into the new security forces, ex-combatants often must go through a selection or 
vetting process. In some states, challenges arise with ex-combatants who are ineligible or 
otherwise not selected through the integration process to join the new military. Challenges may 
also arise where the reintegration program is inadequate or where there is a lack of civilian 
opportunities. In these instances, some states have used the police force as an alternative option 
for integration. Integrating ex-combatants into the police often requires additional training. There 
is also a risk that it may result in the politicization or perceived politicization of the police. 
2. Politicization of the Police 
As seen peripherally in the previous sections, most constitution drafters will be concerned 
with the entanglement of the police with the State’s political forces. One need only look to Korea, 
Great Brittan and Pakistan for recent examples of police forces exercising political will. This is 
particularly challenging when assimilating politically motivated militias into the police. When the 
police become a tool for incumbent regimes, they shift away from civilian oriented policing.  
Impartiality is critical to avoid subjecting certain groups to unjust persecution and purely 
political arrests. Constitutional provisions can restrict police officials from participating in politics 
or occupying political positions. Much like barring judges from political aspirations, some 
constitutions do the same with police leadership. For instance, the Colombian constitution (article 
197) provides that no one who has held the position of the Director General of the Police in the 
year preceding the election may be elected to occupy the post of President of the Republic. The 
Bolivia Constitution (article 123) provides a similar provision to ensure that the incentive structure 
for police leadership is not corrupted by political ambitions. Drafters can anticipate this issue and 
address it directly in constitutional provisions. 
3. Constitutional Options  
Constitutions do not typically address the specific issue of integrating militia members into 
the police force. They may, however, address integration of the security forces by calling for the 
creation of a unified police force and a unified military force within transition chapters. In these 
cases, the details of integration are often left to subsequent legislation or executive orders. In 
South Africa, for instance, the Interim Constitution set the foundation for a unified police force 
while a subsequent white paper detailed the process for integration. The integration process 
enabled ANC/MK members to join the South African Police Service (Knight 2009).   
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Constitutional provisions may also indirectly address the issue by prohibiting the formation 
of private or unregulated militia. Likewise, constitutional provisions may ban political parties 
from maintaining separate militia.    
Gabon Constitution Article 1(22) (1991, as revised, 1997) 
[T]he defense of the nation and the safeguard of public order shall be essentially 
assured by the national defense and security forces.  In consequence, no person, no group 
of persons may constitute itself in private militia or paramilitary grouping; the national 
defense and security forces are at the service of the State.  
Kenya Constitution Article 91(2)(c) (2010) A political party shall not . . . 
establish or maintain a paramilitary force, militia, or similar organization. 
Mozambique Constitution Article 52(3) (2004, as revised, 2007)                                 
Armed associations of a military or paramilitary nature, as well as associations that 
promote violence, racism, xenophobia or pursue aims that are against the law, shall be 
prohibited. 
Guatemala Constitution Article 245 (1985, as revised, 1993)                                              
The organization and functioning of armed groups unregulated by the laws of the 
Republic and its regulations is punishable. 
C.  National Disasters, States of Emergency and International Armed Conflict  
Constitution drafters can also provide for special circumstance when the police must take 
on additional duties or when they must be subsumed by the armed forces or military. Frequently, 
police are subordinated to, or supplemented by, the armed forces in times of national disasters, 
states of emergency, and international armed conflict. Constitutional provisions may also describe 
the coordination and relationship between the armed forces and the police force in certain 
situations. Finally, constitutional provisions may allow the police at the provincial or local levels 
to call on the assistance of the national or federal police or armed forces in times of emergency or 
to restore public security or order when the provincial or local police are unable to do so.   
Dominican Republic Constitution Article 252 (2010) 
The defense of the Nation is the responsibility of the Armed Forces. As such: [. . .] 
2.  They can, as well, intervene when so ordered by the President of the Republic in 
programs destined to promote the social and economic development of the country, to 
mitigate situations of public disaster and calamity, and to assist as auxiliary of the 
National Police to maintain or reestablish the public order in exceptional cases. 
 
Bolivia Constitution Article 254 (2009) 
In the event of international war, the forces of the Bolivian Police shall be 





Hungary Constitution Article 50(1) (2011) 
The Hungarian Defense Forces may be involved in a state of emergency if the use 
of the police and national security services is insufficient. 
 
VII. CONTEXTUAL CONSIDERATIONS 
As stated, stable societies with functioning institutions at all levels of government, 
particularly federations, often wish to have the organization and mission of the police left to 
legislation (e.g. Austria). On the contrary, countries recovering from dictatorship or significant 
oppression may wish to frame the mission and principles of the police in the supreme law of the 
land. Since the three branches of government and various other institutions are established in the 
constitution, it makes sense to outline where the police fit regarding the enforcement of the rule 
of law.  
Constitutional provisions often address the relationship between the police and other 
sectors, namely the judicial sector. This is because the functions of the police and the judicial 
sector overlap in several important areas, such as in the investigation and prosecution of crime.  
Relevant actors may include the prosecution service, judges, lawyers, probation officials, and 
oversight authorities. 
Some countries subject police to other sectors very simply and succinctly, for example:  
El Salvador Constitution Article 193(3) (1983, as revised, 2003) 
It corresponds to the Attorney General . . . [t]o direct the investigation of crime 
with the collaboration of the National Civil Police in the manner determined by law. 
    
Italy Constitution Article 109 (1947, as revised, 2012) 
The legal authorities have direct use of the judicial police. 
 
Spain Constitution Article 126 (1978, as revised, 2011) 
The judicial police shall report to the judges, the courts and the Public Prosecutor 
when discharging their duties of crime investigation and the discovery and arrest of 
offenders, under the terms to be laid down by the law. 
 
Policing touches on many aspects of constitutional democracies and the stronger the related 
institutions such as the judiciary, the more efficient and effective the police can be in service 
delivery. Recently in countries like Libya, Sudan, and South Sudan, mistrust is extensive across 
ethnic and tribal lines. These challenges combined with the fact that the citizens have never 
experienced the concepts of constitutional democracy make provisions on cross institutional 
checks on the police desirable.  
In addition to the traditional government institutions countries transitioning from conflict 
or oppressive regimes may wish to stand up independent commissions or other quasi-
governmental offices for the oversight of the police.  
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In South Africa the President appoints a commissioner to run the police. The 2012 updated 
constitution weaves the governing and monitoring of the police seamlessly through many sections 
culminating in an entire chapter on the police. The police are introduced in a chapter on security 
services (article 199). The chapter on the police tasks an executive cabinet member as the overseer 
of police activity in conjunction and in collaboration with provincial leadership (article 206). 
Article 206 also calls for an independent police complaint body to investigate and reports of police 
misconduct. To further ensure smooth integration with all branches of government: 
South Africa Constitution Article 206(8) (2012) 
A committee composed of the Cabinet member and the members of the Executive Councils 
responsible for policing must be established to ensure effective coordination of the police 
service and effective co-operation among the spheres of government. 
In addition, article 208 establishes a “civilian secretariat” for the police service.  
Other contextual issues to contemplate include federal investigative units and how they 
relate to and work with the police. Central governments usually always have their information 
police at the federal or central levels. India establishes the “Central Bureau of Intelligence and 
Investigation” in the constitution under the list of union responsibilities (article 246).  
IX. EXAMPLES 








Bolivia The Bolivian Police, 
as a public force, has 
the specific mission 
to defend the society 
and conserve public 
order, and to assure 
compliance with the 
law in the entire 
territory of Bolivia.  
The President has the 
power to designate 
and substitute the 
General Commander 
of the Bolivian police 
and to propose 
promotions for the 
General of the Police 
to the Pluri-National 
Legislative 
Assembly. The 
Legislature has the 
power to ratify the 
promotions.  
The Bolivian Police 
Force is subordinate 
to the President of the 
State, through the 
intermediary of the 
Minister of 
Government. The 
military police and 
firemen, auxiliary 
forces and the Army 
reserves, together 
with the civilian 
police, are under the 
control of the 
Governors of the 
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State, Federal District 
and Territories.  
South Africa The objects of the 
police service are to 
prevent, combat and 
investigate crime, to 
maintain public 
order, to protect and 
secure the inhabitants 
of the Republic and 
their property, and to 
uphold and enforce 
the law.  
A member of the 
Cabinet must be 
responsible for 
policing and must 
determine national 




taking into account 
the policing needs 
and priorities of the 
provinces as 






vested in it by this 
Chapter; assigned to 
it in terms of national 
legislation; and 




provide a framework 
for the establishment, 
powers, functions and 
control of municipal 
police services. 
 
Dominican Republic The National Police 
has as its mission: 
1. To safeguard the 
security of the 
citizenry 
2. To prevent and 
control crimes 
3. To prosecute and 
investigate the penal 
infractions, under the 
legal direction of the 
competent authority 
4. To maintain the 
public order to 
protect the free 
exercise of the rights 
of persons and of 
peaceful coexistence 
in accordance with 
The Head of State 
appoints or dismisses 
the members of the 
military and police 
jurisdictions.  
The President of the 
republic directs the 
internal and foreign 
policy, the civil and 
military 
administration, and is 
the supreme authority 
of the Armed Forces, 
of the National Police 
and the other security 
bodies of the State. 
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the Constitution and 
the laws.  
El Salvador Members of the 
National Civil Police 
may not belong to 
political parties nor 
opt for popularly 
elected positions. 
The following are the 
powers and 
obligations of the 
President of the 
Republic:  
to annually fix a 
reasonable number of 
troops for the Armed 
Force and National 
Civil Police. 
The following are the 
powers and 
obligations of the 
President of the 
Republic:  
…to organize, lead 
and maintain the 
National Civil Police 
to preserve peace, 
tranquility, order, and 
public security, in the 
urban realm as well 
as in the rural, with 
strict attachment to 
respect for Human 
Rights and under the 
direction of civil 
authorities… 
Ethiopia If the conduct of the 
police forces 
infringes upon human 
rights and the nation's 
security, [the 










defense and public 
security forces as 
well as a federal 
police force. Each 
State shall establish 
and administer a state 
police force, and to 
maintain public order 
and peace within the 
State. 






public security, and a 
national police force.  
East Timor The police shall 
defend the 
democratic legality 
and guarantee the 
internal security of 
the citizens, and shall 
be strictly non-
The law shall 
determine the rules 
and regulations for 
the police and other 
security forces.  
The law shall 
determine the rules 
and regulations for 
the police and other 
security forces. 
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partisan.  The 
prevention of crime 
shall be undertaken 
with due respect for 
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